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Abstract We develop a theoretical model under which Bgenuine^ or Bconvincing^
smiling is a costly signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring
mutual trust. Prior to a trust interaction involving a decision by a sender to send money to
a recipient, the recipient can emit a signal to induce the sender to trust them. The signal
takes the form of a smile that may be perceived as more or less convincing, and that can be
made more convincing with the investment of greater effort. Individuals differ in their
degree of altruism and in their tendency to display reciprocity. The model generates three
testable predictions. First, the perceived quality of the recipient’s smile is increasing in the
size of the stake. Secondly, the amount sent by the sender is increasing in the perceived
quality of the recipient’s smile. Thirdly, the expected gain to senders from sending money
to the recipient is increasing in the perceived quality of the recipient’s smile.
Keywords Smiling . Costly signaling . Experiment . Trust game
JEL Classifications D03 . D85 . D87 . Z13
Introduction
The man who indulges us in this natural passion, who invites us into his heart,
who, as it were, sets open the gates of his breast to us, seems to exercise a species
of hospitality more delightful than any other. No man, who is in ordinary good
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temper, can fail of pleasing, if he has the courage to utter his real sentiments as he
feels them, and because he feels them.
Adam Smith—The Theory of Moral Sentiments1
This paper develops a model of smiling as a form of signaling behavior whose
purpose is to facilitate economic exchange in situations requiring mutual trust. Smiling
is a form of behavior that exists in all human societies (see Darwin 1872; Ekman 1982;
Niedenthal et al. 2010). It appears to be more elaborate and more central to commu-
nication in humans than in any other species, and to play an important part in
judgments of individuals about the character and general trustworthiness of others.
Yet there is no scientific consensus as to why smiling has evolved to be like this, nor
about what it is in smiling that makes it an appropriate basis for judgments of others.
Here we develop the idea that in early human history, when there were few formal
institutions to regulate social actions and behaviors, human beings needed to find
signals that could reliably help them in determining whom to trust and when to do
so. In these circumstances individuals might have focused on the facial expressions of
others, particularly the expressions of the eyes and mouth.
There is, nevertheless, consensus about a number of the characteristics of smiling
behavior. First, viewers perceive smiles as varying in their degree of Bgenuineness^ or
Bconvincingness^. Since the work of Duchenne (1862) and Darwin (1872) in the 19th
century it has been known that smiles perceived as genuine (known as enjoyment or
BDuchenne^ smiles) are characterized by use of the orbicularis oculi (which surrounds
the eyes) in combination with the zygomatic major (which raises the corners of the
mouth).2 Honest smiling which involves a contraction of the orbicularis oculi further
has the obvious cost of reducing the smiler’s visual field, which both reduces informa-
tional inputs and makes the smiler potentially more vulnerable to enemies and preda-
tors. Doing so would have implied fitness costs for the smiler during our evolutionary
past, and thus should be undertaken only sparingly, which explains why smiling
convincingly may be costly to the smiler.
Second, Duchenne smiles are difficult to fake and are not under straightforward
voluntary control. Duchenne smiles are easier to produce in certain affecting states,
including when the person is in a positive and sharing mood (Mehu et al. 2007). Third,
smiles induce mimicry, both in the sense that individuals viewing smiles by others have
an increased tendency to smile themselves (Niedenthal et al. 2010), and in the sense
that individuals trying to make a good impression on others (as when posing for
photographs) make an effort to smile well. Smiling seems to be a form of communi-
cation. But if so, what do people reveal when smiling, and why have we evolved to
adopt and interpret a form of communication behavior that is under such imperfect
voluntary control?
In this paper we set out a framework in which smiling is modeled as a form of costly
communication (costly in a sense we make precise below) that induces cooperation
between individuals in situations requiring mutual trust. According to this view, the
1 Smith (2000), p.497.
2 Other important characteristics of Duchenne smiles are symmetry and temporal dynamics such as smile
onset, apex, and offset durations for perceived genuineness (Krumhuber et al. 2007).
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necessary costliness of smiling is precisely the reason why it is under such imperfect
conscious control. In a nutshell, smiling may be costly because otherwise it would be
easy to fake, and would not reliably be associated with trustworthiness. This does not
necessarily imply that smiling has evolved to be difficult to fake in order to act as a
signal, but more plausibly that natural selection has recruited as a signal a form of
behavior that is already difficult to fake.
This hypothesis is not original to us (it was advanced by Owren and Bachorowski
2001), but to our knowledge it has not previously been formalized in a way that would
make it capable of being subjected to a comprehensive experimental test. In the
biological and economic literature on signaling, a costly signal is a detectable trait
(which may be physiological or behavioral) that in itself has direct fitness costs3 but
conveys indirect advantages because it is correlated with an underlying invisible trait
which has fitness consequences for another interested individual (such as a mating
partner, a rival or a potential cooperator) whose behavior might be influenced by the
signal. The nature of that correlation could be that individuals with the underlying
invisible trait feel the signal to be less subjectively costly to emit than do the individuals
without the invisible trait, or it could simply be that those with the invisible trait are
more likely to possess the visible trait: it does not have to feel psychologically costly to
be adaptively costly. What matters is the correlation of the invisible and visible traits
and the fact that the visible trait considered purely by itself has adaptive costs.
As will become clear in what follows, whether or not a trait is a costly signal cannot
be simply observed directly. It requires verifying independently four different elements:
the fact that there is a cost to the sender; the fact that the cost is greater for senders who
do not bear the trait; the resulting correlation of the signal with the trait that has fitness
consequences to the receiver; and the causal efficacy of the signal in inducing the
receiver to behave in a way that brings benefits to the sender to compensate for the
fitness costs (see Számadó 2012). We set out precisely how these four elements might
interact and what kind of empirical test might be possible for them. We also acknowl-
edge that the empirical evidence for smiling to be a costly signal in social exchanges is
weak and, to the best our knowledge, there is no existing direct evidence that smiling is
differentially costly; rather, this differential cost is one possible reason for the correla-
tion between the signal and the trait. There are certainly alternative possible theories of
smiling: it might, for example, be a pure coordination device or as a simple expression
of an inner emotional state (see Schmidt and Cohn 2001). Among other things, our
model serves the purpose of making the theory of smiling as a costly signal testable
against these alternative views. It also clarifies that being difficult to fake is not a
sufficient condition for something to be a costly signal (many aspects of our physiology
are difficult to fake); it also has to be reliably correlated with the appropriate adaptive
trait.
It is worth explaining briefly the purpose of a formal model in an argument such as
ours. A model should be considered as a simplified representation that helps us
understand a complex empirical phenomenon, in much the same way that a map is a
3 The economic literature on costly signalling only rarely considers fitness costs explicitly, and costly
signalling may occur when costs are psychologically costly regardless of whether or not these are, in current
environments, adaptively costly. Nevertheless we retain this terminology since the best explanation for why
certain behaviors are psychologically costly is that they were adaptively costly in evolutionary environments.
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simplified representation that helps us to navigate a complex terrain. The purpose of
this model is to help us understand why individuals trying to trust each other might use
a signal that is cognitively costly. In order to explain this we have to suppose that
individuals differ in their degree of trustworthiness, so we use a very simplified
representation of this difference in order to show why a costly signal could be a useful
thing to transmit and to interpret. Our model assumes a certain set of payoff functions
(and does not seek to show how these payoff functions evolved); conditional on these
payoff functions it shows that the use of the signal would be rational (that is, fitness-
enhancing) for the individuals concerned. It abstracts away from other aspects of
individual payoffs that, while doubtless present in reality, do not have to be represented
in the model in order for it to illustrate the functioning of the signaling mechanism.
In Section 2 we briefly review the relevant literature. Section 3 describes our model
in outline. Section 4 derives the equilibrium behavior of the players in the trust
interaction, as a function of the signals already sent and received. Section 5 analyzes
the signals sent. Section 6 discusses empirical implications that have been tested by us
in a companion paper (Centorrino et al. 2015). Section 7 concludes.
Literature Review
Costly signaling has been widely studied since the work of Spence (1973) in economics
and Zahavi (1975) in biology. A signal is any observable trait that is costly to bear for
the sender but which reliably indicates the presence of some advantageous hidden trait.
While the cost can be a pecuniary or non-pecuniary effort cost in economics, or a
fitness cost in biology, the benefit from signaling the hidden trait is that it attracts
partners in mating or in some other mutually beneficial cooperative activity. The benefit
to the signaler of doing so must exceed the cost of the signal, and the partner must also
benefit from responding to the signal. The correlation of the signal and the hidden trait
comes about because the cost of sending the signal is greater for those individuals that
do not possess the advantageous hidden trait than for those who do (Grafen 1990); in
economics this is known as the Bsingle-crossing property .^ Our use below of the
assumption that the cost is greater for those who do not bear the trait corresponds
therefore to standard practice in this literature. In economic exchange, the hidden trait
signaled by smiling could be any characteristic of the smiler (such as her degree of
altruism or tendency to display reciprocity as in Gintis et al. 2003), or a characteristic of
the situation in which the smiler finds herself (such as the size of the stake to be shared,
as in the context of this paper).
Apart from the paper of Owren and Bachorowski (2001), which suggested the
hypothesis, there has not been to our knowledge a significant application of the costly
signaling approach to understanding smiling. However, smiles have been considered as
a coordination device in Manzini et al. (2009), and more broadly, recent studies in
economics and psychology have investigated the importance of emotions in games.
Considering that emotions are not just some random noise but essential in the decision
making process (Damasio 1994), theoretical and experimental work has investigated
how different emotions enter into decision making (Elster 1998; Loewenstein 2000;
Kahneman 2003; Frijda et al. 2004). While the focus has been mostly on negative
social emotions as anger and guilt (Bosman and van Winden 2002; Sanfey et al. 2003;
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de Quervain et al. 2004; Hopfensitz and Reuben 2009), increasing attention has been
given to the use of rewards and the experience of happiness (e.g., Kahneman et al.
1999; Frey 2008; Frey and Neckermann 2009).
Altruism and cheater detection in social dilemmas have been investigated both in
economics and biology (Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Gintis et al. 2001). If signals that
can be used to identify altruists can quickly be imitated by non-altruists, they are not
reliable signals anymore (Fehr and Fischbacher 2005). It has been shown that observ-
able altruism can serve as a reliable signal of trustworthiness in Smith and Bliege Bird
(2000), Gintis et al. (2001) and Lotem et al. (2003). However, in many situations,
altruism cannot be observed, and more broadly the behavior of the interaction partner is
unobserved. To detect whether an interaction partner can be trusted we can either rely
on third party information regarding the target individual’s reputation (Sommerfeld
et al. 2008) or use visual signals concerning the individual’s character (Frank 1988). In
the absence of third party information reputation requires a track record, which is not
possible in one-shot interactions. In order to detect trustworthy partners with some
degree of reliability in these circumstances, it is necessary to make use of the verbal or
non-verbal signals sent by the partner.
Brown and Moore (2002) stress that honest signals with a reliable emotional basis
may be needed to guarantee the positive intentions of a counterpart. This leads to the
importance of ‘emotional expressivity’ i.e., the ability to accurately communicate your
internal feeling state (Boone and Buck 2003). To be reliable, these signals must be
costly and therefore difficult to mimic. Smiles, and especially honest smiles, might be
just that. Brown et al. (2003) were the first to observe that videos from self-reported
altruists are rated differently by neutral observers than videos of non-altruists. Further,
an analysis of video recordings from altruists and non-altruists showed that self-
reported altruists showed more orbicularis oculi activity and more symmetric smiles
(see also Oda et al. 2009). However, the existing empirical evidence in favor of the
view that smiles reliably indicate altruistic intent is at best mixed. This is true when
players are directly confronted with their partners in dyadic or triadic conversations or
are shown pictures and sliced clips of their opponent.
Several different types of interaction have been used to study this question. The
preferred setting appears to be the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In this context, Vogt et al.
(2013) report an experiment in which they use short video clips of subjects. These ‘thin
sliced’ clips were recorded while participants discussed a variety of topics not related to
the game itself. Vogt et al. (2013) find that other informed experimental subjects were
not able to make use of these clips to infer trustworthiness. Manson et al. (2013)
provide evidence that defectors cannot be detected with better-than-chance accuracy
either by their game partners or by informed or uninformed external observers. Lyons
and Aitken (2008) show that the frequency of smiles does not significantly affect the
ability of a player to identify a cooperative partner; and their duration is negatively
correlated with the prediction of cooperation. In contrast to these three studies, Johnston
et al. (2010) use video clips and test cooperation on the basis of comparison of
enjoyment and non-enjoyment smiles. In their experiment, participants evaluated
individuals displaying enjoyment smiles more positively than those displaying non-
enjoyment smiles and had higher rates of cooperation with those displaying enjoyment
smiles. Finally, Reed et al. (2012) report that players are able to use facial actions as
credible signals of cooperative intent in dyadic interactions.
Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology (2015) 1:325–340 329
An alternative setting for studying this question is the ultimatum game. Schug et al.
(2010) find that individuals who are prone to cooperate as proposers are more emo-
tionally expressive when facing unfair treatment by others than those who do not,
including in the tendency to emit Duchenne as opposed to non-Duchenne smiles.
Mussel et al. (2014) instead study the reaction of the receiver when she is shown a
still picture of the proposer before deciding whether to accept or reject the offer. They
find that when proposals are accompanied by smiles this reduces the negative emotions
felt by recipients in the face of disappointing offers and increases the probability of
acceptance for a given offer.
Finally, the trust game (Berg et al. 1995) has been used by Scharlemann et al. (2001)
and in our companion paper (Centorrino et al. 2015). The trust game differs from the
Prisoners’ Dilemma in two ways: first, the two players play sequentially and the
decision of the second is conditional on the decision of the first. Secondly, because
of this sequential structure, non-cooperation by the first player is not a dominant
strategy, unlike in the Prisoner’s Dilemma where non-cooperation is dominant for both.
On the contrary, the first player has an incentive to cooperate if she believes that the
second will do so, notwithstanding the dominant nature of the second player’s non-
cooperation strategy.
Scharlemann et al. (2001) use still pictures and find that smiles positively affect trust
among strangers. Facial features can also affect cooperation. Centorrino et al. (2015)
use instead video clips recorded by trustees in which they incite their partner to play
with them the trust game. Trustors decide whether to send the game stake after
watching these videos. We find that Duchenne smiles are causally effective in inducing
the target to cooperate with the trustee.
The variety of settings used to elicit smiles as a signal of cooperation explain part of
the difference in the current experimental literature. However, the informational feature
of the game seems also to play an important role. In Lyons and Aitken (2008), Manson
et al. (2013), and Vogt et al. (2013), whether in dyadic conversations or in recorded
video-clips, players were not informed about the game they were going to play or were
explicitly asked not to discuss it. In contrast, the studies by Johnston et al. (2010) and
Reed et al. (2012) give full information to participants before they interact with their
opponent. This seems to point towards the fact that smiles might signal different things in
different contexts and that the information about the task is essential in order to produce
the Bright^ smile. This view is also consistent with the result by Mehu et al. (2007), that
honest smiles are produced when the person feels in a particular sharing mood.
The study by Mussel et al. (2014) shows an impact of smiles on the behavior of
those who observe them, but (as the title BSmiling faces, sometimes they don’t tell the
truth^ implies) is skeptical of the value of information conveyed by a smile. However,
the authors do not test for that value. In their experiment, smiling and non-smiling faces
are in fact randomly associated to each offer made by the proposer. The focus is
therefore on the psychology of the receiver, who does not seem to adjust her expecta-
tions upward when seeing a smiling face, but instead becomes more willing to accept
an unfair offer. Smiling, in this case, plays the role of easing the disappointment of the
receiver after an unfair behavior from the proposer. Furthermore, a one-shot ultimatum
game like the one designed by these authors seems unfit to test for cooperation. The
ultimatum game is based on a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which seems more suited for
eliciting fairness or inequality aversion.
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The existing empirical results only confirm that there may be a plethora of ways in
which smiles can be used as a communication device in strategic interactions. This
partly depends on the task used and partly on its informational features.
In the present paper, we have decided to use the trust game as framework for our model.
The advantages of the trust game are several. First of all, to the best of our knowledge, the
existing experimental literature has found that smiles in the trust game can effectively induce
cooperation. Secondly, in the trust game, the role of the sender and the receiver of the signal
are very well defined. This allows to test whether smiles act through the psychology of the
sender or of the receiver or both. This is an impossible task in a simultaneous game, such as
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where both players play the role of both sender and receiver.
Moreover, unlike in the ultimatum game (which is also sequential and therefore distin-
guishes the roles of sender and receiver), the trustee also makes a decision and it is therefore
possible to test whether the signal of cooperation truthfully reveals the action of the trustee.
The model we develop hypothesizes that trustees may be motivated, to a greater or
lesser degree, both by reciprocity and by altruism. In keeping with our approach of
using the simplest model necessary to illustrate the mechanism, we do not need to
hypothesize that senders are altruistic, which would complicate the algebra for no
additional insight. There is a large literature addressing ways of incorporating social
preferences in individual utility functions (see Sobel 2005, for a survey). It is safe to say
that there is no consensus as to the appropriate way of modelling such motivations, and
it is emphatically not our intention to propose a general theory here. For instance, in
many models of behavior in public goods games, individuals are considered to be
motivated either by reciprocity or by altruism but not both (Fehr et al. 2003); this is a
useful device for focusing on the distinction between unconditional contributors and
conditional contributors. Other papers (Hwang and Bowles 2010; Brülhart and Usunier
2004) hypothesize that individuals may have both motivations simultaneously to
different degrees, and that is the approach we adopt here. This is a plausible and
parsimonious way to capture the phenomenon, clearly present in many experimental
studies including our own (Centorrino et al. 2015), that individuals vary in their degree
of trustworthiness. It is not just that some are trustworthy while others are not, but also
that among individuals who are trustworthy, some are more generously or fully so than
others. The combination of reciprocity and altruism in our model captures this differ-
ence, but we make no claim that it is the only modeling strategy that would do so.
Outline of the Model
In our model players engage in a trust interaction. For ease of exposition, we give this the
rather specific structure of an experimental trust game, but it is also a schematic
representation of a much wider range of circumstances in which individuals take a
chance on the trustworthiness of others in the hope of a subsequent gain from cooper-
ation. They are able to engage in a signaling interaction before they do so. Thus,
although our model represents a rather particular type of interaction between the players,
the general conclusion of the analysis applies to a much more general class of economic
situations, in which the parties interact without expectation of an extended relationship,
one of the parties must make a commitment before the other, and the other will therefore
try to signal trustworthiness in order to induce that commitment to be made.
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There are two players, A and B. To avoid confusion we shall refer to A as Bhe^ and
to B as Bshe^, though there is no intrinsic gender difference in the roles.
Player A receives a stake of value s and must decide whether or not to send it to
player B. For pedagogical purposes we shall compare two situations: one with s=1 and
the other with s=2; once again this is for expository clarity but more general cases
could be considered without changing the underlying intuition. If the stake is sent it is
multiplied by three, and player B may choose to (i) keep the new enlarged stake for
herself; (ii) send back to A the original stake and keep twice the stake; (iii) divide the
new enlarged stake equally between herself and player A.
There is nothing special about the number three except that it is significantly greater
than two, indicating that if the parties are willing to trust each other they can each gain
significantly more than the original stake. The analysis below could be undertaken for
any multiplicative factor greater than two without affecting the qualitative results, but
we use the number three both to keep the exposition intuitive and because this
corresponds to the factor that has typically been used in experimental settings, includ-
ing that in our companion paper.
Player A’s decision will be influenced by his beliefs about player B along two
dimensions – how much player B cares about strong reciprocity,4 and how altruistic she
is (we make these terms precise below). With respect to strong reciprocity, Player B
may be one of two types θ ∈ (L,H); for simplicity we assume there are equal
proportions of the two types in the population, though nothing of importance turns
on this. H types have stronger preferences for reciprocity than L types (we can call
these High Reciprocators and Low Reciprocators respectively). With respect to altru-
ism, player B has a component of her utility that is a stochastic function of the amount
she sends back to A. Player B knows her own type at the start of the game, and notably
when she makes a video clip in order to persuade player A to send her his stake.
If player A sends the stake, player B must decide to send back to player A a multiple
m of the original stake. In principle that multiple could be chosen from a continuous
interval, but to aid intuition we are interested in the choice between three types of reply,
which we can call Bselfish^, Breciprocating^ and Bgenerous^, and which we represent
by m ∈ (0,1,1.5). Since the stake has been multiplied by 3, this means player B has a
choice between keeping all the stake (the selfish strategy), keeping two-thirds of it (the
reciprocating strategy), and keeping half of it (the generous strategy). Note that since
the generous strategy involves the parties splitting the gains equally, it could be
motivated by a desire for equality rather than altruism; the latter is the motivation we
shall employ in our model. For our purposes nothing of importance turns on this point,
though in other contexts it might matter which of these motivations was at work.
Prior to this interaction, player B communicates with player A, sending him a costly
signal which can take the form of a smile. Then A forms a belief about B’s type based
on the signal. If A chooses not to send the stake the game ends, A keeps the stake and B
receives a zero monetary payoff (and a total payoff that may include a cost of effort
involved in sending the signal). If A chooses to send the stake then B finally chooses
what multiple of the stake to return to A, and the game ends.
4 In games with costly punishment, strong reciprocators are also willing to engage in such punishment, but that
is not at issue here.
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As is standard we solve the game backwards from the end, finding a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
Moves in the Trust Game
Player B’s Move
We model player B’s motivation for returning a multiple of A’s original stake using a
random utility function. It is separable in money and in two types of social preference.
The first social preference is for strong reciprocity, which we model as a fixed utility
derived from sending back at least the original stake to player A, but not otherwise
varying according to the amount sent. This utility, which differs between types, is given
by αθ, where 1>αH>αL>0.5.
The second motivation is altruism, which is increasing in the amount sent back by B
to A (it can be thought of as reflecting B’s pleasure at knowing that she is increasing A’s
payoff). We model this as a utility that is a multiple β of the amount returned, plus a
random error term ε. The coefficient β is itself random and may be greater or less than
one (capturing the fact that, of players who return at least some money, some return
only the original stake while others return a larger amount). Specifically, β∈{0.5,1.5}
with probability (1−pθ,pθ). This is without loss of generality. Every value of β greater
than 1 would imply that player B derives positive net utility by choosing the generous
option. Also, every value of β lower than 1 implies that player B suffers a net loss when
transferring the stake to A. She will thus choose the selfish or the reciprocating option,
depending on other parameters of the game. We assume that pH>pL to reflect the fact
that individuals with a greater propensity for reciprocity are also likely to be more
altruistic.
We therefore model player B’s utility function as follows:
UB ¼ 3s−msþ αθ þ βmsþ ε ifm > 0 ð1Þ
UB ¼ 3s ifm ¼ 0 ð2Þ
where s is the amount sent, m is the amount returned, the error term ε has a zero mean,
and is uniformly distributed between −0.5 and +0.5.
As noted above, if β=1.5, player B will always choose m=1.5, since his utility is
always strictly increasing in m. Thus either type of player will choose m=1.5 with
probability pθ.
If β=0.5 on the other hand, player B’s utility is strictly decreasing in m once m is
positive. Thus B will either choose m=0 or m=1. The probability of choosing m=1 is





If s=1, s2−ε is distributed uniformly on [0,1], so the probability thatm=1 is just (1−pθ)αθ.
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If s=2, s2−ε is distributed uniformly on [0.5,1.5], so the probability that m=1 is just
(1−pθ)(αθ−0.5).
We can write this probability as a function of s, namely as





We therefore summarize in Table 1 the probabilities of choosing different values of
m according to whether the player is of high or low type and whether the stakes are high
or low, as follows:
Player A’s Move
Player Awill send the money if the expected value of doing so is greater than the sure
value of keeping it.
We also model player A’s decision using a random utility function. We consider his
utility as given by his expected payoff plus an error term η which is uniformly
distributed between –e and 0 (we can consider this as a way of allowing for risk
aversion while keeping the advantages of linear utility: η=0 corresponds to risk
neutrality, while η=−e is the highest risk aversion in the population). We ignore
altruism and/or inequality aversion on the part of player A. While these traits can be
important to explain the behavior of players in experimental interactions, they are not
contingent on the characteristics of player B. Hence, since the focus of our model is on
how A reacts to the signal sent by B, we believe that this simplification does not affect
our main results.
Player A’s decision then depends on γ, his subjective probability of facing a High
Reciprocator type. He will send the money if the gain from receiving a net profit of half
the original stake, multiplied by the probability that B chooses m=1.5, exceeds the loss
of the whole original stake, multiplied by the probability that B chooses m=0.
Formally, A sends the money iff:














1−pHð Þ 1þsð Þ2 −αH
 
1−pHð Þ αH þ 1−sð Þ2
 
pH
Low Reciprocator type (θ=L) 1−pLð Þ 1þsð Þ2 −αL
 
1−pLð Þ αL þ 1−sð Þ2
 
pL
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Notice that the right hand side of Eq. (4) is strictly increasing in s. This means that,
for given γ, player A is less likely to send the money when the stakes are high than
when they are low. Thus if we observe a higher probability of sending the money when
the stakes are high, this must mean that A players have higher levels of γ.
Because of the uniform distribution of η, we can write the probability that an A
player sends the money, given the value of γ, as qγ, where
qγ ¼
0:5 γpH þ 1−γð ÞpLð Þ−γ 1−pHð Þ 1þ sð Þ=2−αHð Þ− 1−γð Þ 1−pLð Þ 1þ sð Þ=2−αLð Þ½ 
e
ð5Þ
Differentiating (5) with respect to γ yields:
∂qγ
∂γ
¼ 0:5 pH−pLð Þ− 1−pHð Þ 1þ sð Þ=2−αHð Þ þ 1−pLð Þ 1þ sð Þ=2−αLð Þ½ 
e
> 0 ð6Þ






which shows that a given increase in γ will result in a larger increase in qγ when s=2
than when s=1. So higher stakes make the probability of sending the money more
sensitive to player A’s subjective probability that player B is the High Reciprocator
type.
Smiling as the Signal
Now consider the sending of the signal. Player B invests effort e, which has an
increasing convex cost cθ(e), where cH(e)<cL(e) for all positive values of e. This
inequality can be interpreted as a simple incentive compatibility constraint and it is at
the core of our model: if player B of L type could successfully mimic an H type at the
same (or lower) cost, H would not have any advantage in trying to signal her type.
This effort produces a smile whose quality is related to the effort exerted via an
increasing function g(e,τ), where τ is a random variable, and the probability distribution
function f(g|e) has the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property.
We begin by assuming that this smile has a predictable positive effect on player A’s
subjective probability γ that player B is the High Reciprocator type. Without such an
effect neither player would have any incentive to exert any effort at all. This effect can
be represented by the Bsmile function^ γ=γ(g), where γ′>0. The function γ(g) need not
be concave but if not cθ(e) must be sufficiently convex to yield a unique interior
solution.
We next go on to show that if player B knows this, and if the quality of the smile
responds to her effort, she has reason to invest effort in smiling in such a way that the
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smile will indeed be a positive signal not just of her effort but also of the probability
that she is the High Reciprocator type. Thus A’s tendency to display greater trust in
individuals who have more convincing smiles is one that could be expected to evolve
under natural selection since it would correspond to a real empirical regularity.
To see this, write Vsθ for the expected utility B will receive if player A sends the
money and note that VsH≥VsL.5 Writing esθ* for the optimal choice of effort by a player B








Any function g(e,τ) that has the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property will imply that
the conditional probability that player B is the High Reciprocator type is increasing in
the value of g(e,τ). To see this note that Bayes’ Law with a uniform prior implies that





which is monotonically increasing in g by Eq. (8) and the Monotone Likelihood Ratio
Property. This means that an increasing smile function γ(g) is indeed consistent with





Finally, given that the convincingness of smiles is the result of effort in the way
described in Eq. (10), we can calculate how the expected gain to A from sending
money is related to smile quality. We write the expected gain to A from sending the
money, conditional on smile quality as follows




þ ð1−prðθ ¼ H






5 The reason why the expected utility for B players of type H is higher than the utility for those that are L is
that they have more altruism payoff than L players do. They could choose to return the same amount as L
players do and would get at least as much utility as L players from doing so. In fact they choose to return more
(in expected terms) than L players do, so their expected utility must be higher.
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We can rewrite (12) as
E UAjg; sð Þ ¼ pr θ ¼ H jgð Þð Þ 1:5s pH−pLð Þ þ s αH−αLð Þ
s 1−sð Þ
2
pH−pLð Þ þ s αLpL−αHpHð Þ
 	





and therefore we can write the derivative of E (UA|g,s) with respect to pr(θ=H|g) as
∂E UAjg; sð Þ
∂pr θ ¼ H jgð Þ ¼ s sþ 0:5ð Þ pH−pLð Þ þ αH−αLð Þ þ pLαL−pHαHð Þ½  ð14Þ
which is strictly positive because
sþ 0:5ð Þ pH−pLð Þ þ αH−αLð Þ þ pLαL−pHαHð Þ½  > sþ 0:5ð Þ pH−pLð Þ
þ αH 1−pHð Þ−αH 1−pLð Þ ¼ sþ 0:5ð Þ pH−pLð Þ−αH pH−pLð Þ½ 
ð15Þ
and the expression on the RHS is positive for any s≥0.5.
From this it follows, given (10), that
∂E UAjg; sð Þ
∂g
> 0 ∀g; s ð16Þ
which is just the statement that the expected gain to player A from sending the stake to
player B is increasing in the perceived convincingness of player B’s signal.
Testable Implications
Our hypothesis that smiling in a way that is perceived as convincing is a costly signal
has the following testable implications:
H1: The perceived quality of player B’s smile is increasing in the size of the stake:
this follows from inequality (9) given that g(.) is an increasing function;
H2: The amount sent by player A is increasing in the perceived quality of the smile:
this follows from inequality (11);
H3: The expected gain to player A from sending the stake to player B is increasing in
the perceived quality of player B’s smile: this follows from inequality (16).
H1 is necessary in order to distinguish this hypothesis from two alternative views:
first, that smiling is a form of costless communication that solves pure coordination
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problems (like Bcheap talk^), and secondly, that it is not communication at all but
merely an outward sign of an inner emotional state (like blushing, say). H2 is necessary
to explain why human beings should have evolved the habit of communicating in this
costly way. H3 is necessary to explain why human beings should also have evolved the
tendency to be influenced by the smiles of others.
In our companion paper (Centorrino et al. 2015) we subject these three predictions to
an experimental test that significantly supports all three. The experiment consisted in a
two person trust game where senders observed short video clips of trustees before
taking their decisions. Potential trustees (84 participants from Toulouse, France) made
two video clips averaging around 15 seconds for viewing by potential senders before
the latter decided whether to send them money. Senders (198 participants from Lyon,
France) made trust decisions with respect to the recorded clips. Clips were further rated
concerning the genuineness of the displayed smiles. We have observed that smiles rated
as more genuine by senders strongly predict judgments about the trustworthiness of
trustees, and willingness to send them money. We observe a relation between costs and
benefits: smiles from trustees playing for higher stakes are rated as significantly more
genuine. Finally, we show that those rated as smiling genuinely return more money on
average to senders.
In addition there exists some corroborating evidence for H2 and H3 elsewhere in the
literature. H2 is the only one of the three predictions that has been tested directly in the
existing literature. It has received significant support in Scharlemann et al. (2001) and
in Johnston et al. (2010). While Scharlemann et al. (2001) use still pictures to detect
trustworthy partners, Johnston et al. (2010) uses video clips and tests cooperation in a
prisoners’ dilemma on the basis of comparison of two clips.
Schug et al. (2010) find that individuals who are prone to cooperate as proposers in
an ultimatum game are more emotionally expressive when facing unfair treatment by
others than those who do not, including in the tendency to emit Duchenne as opposed
to non-Duchenne smiles. This finding is consistent with H3 though not directly implied
by it.
Conclusions
We have developed a model of smiling convincingly as a costly signal that has evolved
to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Individuals differ both in
their willingness to engage in reciprocity and in their degree of altruism, and it is in
their interest to signal this to others. In order to do so they must smile convincingly, but
to do so involves costly effort. The model generates three testable predictions. First, the
perceived quality of player B’s smile is increasing in the size of the stake. Secondly, the
amount sent by player A is increasing in the perceived quality of the smile. Thirdly, the
expected gain to player A from sending the stake to player B is increasing in the
perceived convincingness of player B’s smile. We test, and find support for, these three
predictions in our companion paper.
Our model suggests that individuals who have payoff functions of the kind we
hypothesize would be able to signal trustworthiness to each other. It does not consider
by what precise process such payoff functions might have evolved. This seems to us – as
in the case of other costly signals – an interesting and important subject for future research.
338 Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology (2015) 1:325–340
Acknowledgments The authors are grateful to the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology in Plön
for financial support. Support through the ANR - Labex IAST is gratefully acknowledged.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic
Behavior, 10, 122–142.
Boone, R. T., & Buck, R. (2003). Emotional Expressivity and Trustworthiness: the role of nonverbal behavior
in the evolution of cooperation. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 27(3), 163–182.
Bosman, R., & van Winden, F. (2002). Emotional hazard in a power to take experiment. The Economic
Journal, 112, 147–169.
Brown, W. M., & Moore, C. (2002). Smile asymmetries and reputation as reliable indicators of likelihood to
cooperate: An evolutionary analysis. In S. P. Shobov (Ed.), Advances in psychology research (Vol. 11, pp.
59–78). New York: Nova.
Brown, W. M., Palameta, B., & Moore, C. (2003). Are there nonverbal cues to commitment? An exploratory
study using the zero-acquaintance video presentation paradigm. Evolutionary Psychology, 1, 42–69.
Brülhart, M., & Usunier, J.-C. (2004). Verified trust: Reciprocity, altruism, and noise in trust games. Working
paper 04.15, Université de Lausanne.
Centorrino, S., Djemai, E., Hopfensitz, A., Milinski, M., & Seabright, P. (2015). Honest signalling in trust
interactions: smiles rated as genuine induce trust and signal higher earnings opportunities. Evolution and
Human Behavior, 36(1), 8–16.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, &
J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. New York: Avon Books.
Darwin, C. R. (1872). The expression of the emotions in man and animals. London: John Murray.
de Quervain, D., Fischbacher, U., Treyer, V., Schellhammer, M., Schnyder, U., Buck, A., & Fehr, E. (2004).
The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science, 305(5688), 1254–1258.
Duchenne de Boulogne, C._B. (1862). The mechanism of human facial expression. Paris: Jules Renard.
Ekman, P. (1982). Emotion in the human face (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, J. (1998). Emotions and economic theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(1), 47–74.
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2005). Altruists with green beards. Analyse and Kritik, 27(2005), 73–84.
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., & Gächter, S. S. (2003). Strong reciprocity, human cooperation and the enforcement
of social norms. Human Nature, 13(1), 1–25.
Frank, R. H. (1988). Passions within Reason. The strategic role of the emotions. New York: Norton.
Frey, B. (2008). Happiness: A revolution in economics. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Frey, B., & Neckermann, S. (2009). Awards: A disregarded source of motivation. In M. Baurmann & B.
Lahno (Eds.), Perspectives in moral science – contributions from philosophy, economics, and politics in
honour of Hartmut Kliemt (pp. 177–182). Frankfurt: Frankfurt School Verlag.
Frijda, N., Manstead, A., & Fischer, A. (2004). Feelings and emotions: Where do we stand? In A. Manstead,
N. Frijda, & A. Fischer (Eds.), Feelings and emotions: The Amsterdam symposium. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Gintis, H., Smith, E. A., & Bowles, S. (2001). Costly signaling and cooperation. Journal of Theoretical
Biology, 213(1), 103–119.
Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., & Fehr, E. (2003). Explaining altruistic behavior in Humans. Evolution and
Human Behavior, 24, 153–172.
Grafen, A. (1990). Biological signals as handicaps. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 144, 517–546.
Hopfensitz, A., & Reuben, E. (2009). The importance of emotions for the effectiveness of social punishment.
The Economic Journal, 119, 1534–1559.
Hwang, S.-H., & Bowles, S. (2010). Is Altruism bad for cooperation? Working paper, University of
Massachusetts.
Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology (2015) 1:325–340 339
Johnston, L., Miles, L., & Macrae, C. N. (2010). Why are you smiling at me? Social functions of enjoyment
and non-enjoyment smiles. British Journal of Social Psychology, 49, 107–127.
Kahneman, D. (2003). A psychological perspective on economics. The American Economic Review, 93(2),
162–168.
Kahneman, D., Diener, E., & Schwarz, N. (Eds.). (1999).Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology.
New York: Russell Sage.
Krumhuber, E., Manstead, A. S. R., Cosker, D., Marshall, D., Rosin, P. L., & Kappas, A. (2007). Facial
dynamics as indicators of trustworthiness and cooperative behaviour. Emotion, 7, 730–735.
Loewenstein, G. (2000). Emotions in economic theory and economic behaviour. American Economic Review,
90(2), 426–432.
Lotem, A., Fishman, M. A., & Stone, L. (2003). From reciprocity to unconditional altruism through signalling
benefits. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 270, 199–205.
Lyons, M. T., & Aitken, S. J. (2008). Machiavellianism in strangers affects cooperation. Journal of
Evolutionary Psychology, 6(3), 173–185.
Manson, J. H., Gervais, M. M., & Kline, M. A. (2013). Defectors cannot be detected during Bsmall talk^ with
strangers. PLoS ONE, 8(12), e82531.
Manzini, P., Sadrieh, A., & Vriend, N. J. (2009). On smiles, winks and handshakes as coordination devices.
The Economic Journal, 119, 826–854.
Mehu, M., Grammer, K., & Dunbar, R. (2007). Smiles when sharing. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28,
415–422.
Mussel, P., Hewig, J., Allen, J. J. B., Coles, M. G. H., & Wolfgang, M. (2014). Smiling faces, sometimes they
don’t tell the truth: facial expression in the ultimatum game impacts decision making and event-related
potentials. Psychophysiology, 51, 358–363.
Niedenthal, P., Mermillod, M., Maringer, M., & Hess, U. (2010). The Simulation of Smiles (SIMS) model:
embodied simulation and the meaning of facial expression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(06), 417–
433.
Oda, R., Yamagata, N., Yabiku, Y., &Matsumoto-Oda, A. (2009). Altruism can be assessed correctly based on
impression. Human Nature, 20(3), 331–341.
Owren, M. J., & Bachorowski, J.-A. (2001). The evolution of emotional expression: A Bselfish-gene^ account
of smiling and laughter in early hominids and humans. In T. J. Mayne & G. A. Bonnano (Eds.), Emotions:
Current issues and future directions (pp. 152–191). New York: Guilford Press.
Reed, L. I., Zenglen, K. N., & Schmidt, K. L. (2012). Facial expressions as honest signals of cooperative intent
in a one-shot anonymous prisoner’s dilemma game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 33, 200–209.
Sanfey, A., Rilling, J., Aronson, J., Nystrom, L., & Cohen, J. J. (2003). The neural basis of economic decision
making in the ultimatum game. Science, 300(5626), 1755–1758.
Scharlemann, J. P. W., Eckel, C. C., Kacelnik, A., & Wilson, R. K. (2001). The value of a smile: game theory
with a human face. Journal of Economic Psychology, 22, 617–640.
Schmidt, K. L., & Cohn, J. F. (2001). Human facial expressions as adaptations: evolutionary questions in
facial expression research. American Journal of Physical Anthropology, Suppl 33, 3–24.
Schug, J., Matsumoto, D., Horita, Y., Yamagishi, T., & Bonnet, K. (2010). Emotional expressivity as a signal
of cooperation. Evolution and Human Behavior, 31(2), 87–94.
Smith, A. (2000). The theory of moral sentiments. New York: Prometheus Books.
Smith, E. A., & Bliege Bird, R. (2000). Turtle hunting and tombstone opening: public generosity as costly
signalling. Evolution and Human Behavior, 21(4), 245–261.
Sobel, J. (2005). Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. Journal of Economic Literature, XLIII(June),
392–436.
Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2008). Multiple gossip statements and their effect on
reputation and trustworthiness. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 275, 2529–2536.
Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355–374.
Számadó, S. (2012). The rise and fall of handicap principle: a commentary on the BModelling and the fall and
rise of the handicap principle^. Biological Philosophy, 27, 279–286.
Vogt, S., Efferson, C., & Fehr, E. (2013). Can we see inside? Predicting strategic behavior given limited
information. Evolution and Human Behavior, 34, 258–264.
Zahavi, A. (1975). Mate selection—a selection for a handicap. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 53(1), 205–
214.
340 Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology (2015) 1:325–340
